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Contractual Capacity
of Married Women and
Infants in the Conflict of Laws
In this Article the author briefly examines the choice-of-law
rules governing the validity of contracts entered into by
married women and infants. He concludes that while the
rules have been confusing and their applicationuncertain,
the cases reveal that courts have generally held the contracts to be valid and enforceable if valid in any state which
has a sufficient contact with the parties or the contract.

Albert A. Ehrenzweig*
THE conflicts law of contracts is generally accused of
being "the most confused subject in the field of Conflict of Laws."
In a series of articles I have tried to show, however, that the decisions of the courts in this field have in fact been quite consistent
and rational if analyzed in the light of the courts' actual doing
rather than of their dogmatic language.2 To be sure, the "first principles of legal thinking, 3 as embodied in the traditional rules of the
lex contractus, the lex solutionis, the implied intention, and the
center of gravity, hardly enable the lawyer to predict the outcome
of his case. But the analysis, suggested by Walter Wheeler Cook,
of small groups of cases and problems,4 leads, I believe, to a very
* Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. For quotations from Beale, Goodrich, Lorenzen, and casebooks, see Morris,
The Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exploded, 6 VAoN. L. REv.
505 (1953). See also STumEa, CoN'-acr oF LAws 224 (2d ed. 1951). See generally SEEEc-ED REA iNGs or THE CoNrucCT OF LAws 695 (1956); see particularly
Lorenzen, The Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws pts. 2, 3,
30 YALE L.J. 565, 31 YAX. L.J. 53 (1921); Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts, 51 YA.LE L.J. 893 (1942).
2. Ehrenzweig, The Real Estate Broker in the Conflict of Laws, 59 CoLtM.
L. REv. 303 (1959); Ehrenzweig, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws (to
be published); Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws: The Basic Rule of
Validation (to be published).
3. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1992) (opinion of Holmes, J.).
See EHmENZWmEI, CONFLicT OF LAWs 11, 13 (1959).
4. Coox, THE LoicAL AND LEAL BAsES OF THE CoNrFucr oF LAws 431 (1949).
See also Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy,
19 U. Cn.L. REv.339 (1952).
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simple and rational conclusion: Equal parties to a contract0 intend to be bound. Their agreement will therefore quite usually be
upheld as against claims of invalidity based on either the forum
or a foreign law, if another "properly" applicable law supports this
decision. The few exceptions to this Basic Rule of Validation are
subject to specific analysis and enumeration. The question whether
the defense of incapacity constitutes such an exception will be examined in this Article.
An agreement purportedly entered into by a person physically
incapable of forming the intention to be bound may be held invalid as lacking consent, an essential element of a valid contract.0
Any court will feel free so to hold without regard to any foreign
law that may otherwise be said to "govern" that agreement. Technical problems of conflicts law can arise only in two situations.
In the first place, a claim of invalidity or validity may be based
on a court decree purporting to deprive a person of, or to endow
him with, capacity to act with legal effect. In this case the conflicts
problem is one concerning the effect of a judgment with which I have
dealt elsewhere.7 And secondly, the claim of invalidity may be based
on a law which deprives certain categories of persons of their legal
capacity without regard to their individual state of mind and intellect.
Such laws typically concern married women and persons below a
certain age. At all times, in all countries, the question has been
raised whether such incapacities should follow such persons
outside the state which has "created" the incapacity. When
feudalism postulated an exclusive regime of the lex situs, it
remained doubtful whether this regime also excluded consideration of the foreigner's own "personal" law of capacity. Was a married woman, a child, a mentally defective person able to bind
himself in a transaction concerning forum land because he was
capable to do so under the law of his home state though not under
the law of the forum? Was he incapacitated by his personal law
though capable under the lex fori? Notwithstanding opinions to
the contrary, the continental theory to this day has in substance
adhered to the rule that a person's capacity in both cases is determined by his "personal law.""
Story shared the feudalist preoccupation with this problemY
5. As to contracts between unequal partners, see Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Guidici v. Guidici, 2 Cal. 2d 497, 41 P.2d 932 (1935) (incapacity
to contract in Nevada because of intoxication).
7. EHRENzwcE, CONFLIcr OF LAWS 185-88 (1959).
8. 1 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAws 173-88 (2d ed. 1959). BATIFFOL, Daorr INrEMlNATIONAL PrVE 452 passim (3d ed. 1959). But see, for recent tendencies to tho con.
trary, Drobnig, Comment, 5 Am. J. CouMs. L. 487, 489 (1956).
9. More than one-tenth of the first edition, STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws (1834),
is devoted to this problem.
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But while trying to do justice to continental doctrine, he pleaded,
on grounds of convenience and equity, for the application of the
law of the contract. 10 For, he asked, "how are the inhabitants of
any country to ascertain the condition of such persons by the law
of a foreign country, or the law of the domicile of his origin?"'"
We shall agree with his rejection of the personal law. But there remains the question why a contract should be held invalid under
the law of the place of contracting in cases in which the person
lacking capacity to contract under that law did have such capacity
under his own law. Only a hopelessly doctrinaire search for general
principles can explain this result
Leaving aside possible findings of physical incapacity which as
stated above are independent from the applicable law, no reason is
apparent at the outset why (except of course for a possible coercive application of forum law on policy grounds) an agreement
involving a minor or a married woman should not be subject to the
general Rule of Validation. No reason is apparent why such an
agreement should not be held valid in accordance with the parties' intention, under either the lex fori or any other law having a
substantial contact with the agreement. And, indeed, were it not
for a complex history of the problem reaching into a distant feudal
past, and the more recent dogmatic deviation of our conflicts law, n'
no court would doubt that the Rule of Validation is the law. Analysis of the case law governing contracts of married women and infants supports this proposition.
Marriedwomen
The only decision of the United States Supreme Court, Union
Trust Co. v. Grosman,3 is to the contrary. A guaranty executed in
Illinois by a Texas married woman was held unenforceable in
Texas under Texas law notwithstanding its enforceability under the
law of Illinois. But the case was decided almost half a century ago,
and being based on a fast disappearing attitude toward women's
rights and obligations, should, at least outside Texas, cease to be
relied on as authority. 4 No longer can it be considered "extravagant
to suppose that the courts [of the state of the woman's domicile]
will help a married woman to make her property there liable in
circumstances in which the local law says that it shall be free,
10. Id. at 97.
11. Id. at 74.
12. See E~tmtzwEG, CoNrucr OF LAwS 8-13 (1959). For what is probably
the most thorough and discriminating analysis of American, English, French and
Scottish case law, see Smith, Capacity in the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative
Study, 1 INTL & COIP. L.Q. 446 (1952).

13. 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
14. But see, e.g., King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.V.2d 803, cert. denied,
832 U.S. 769 (1947). See also Teas v. Kimball, 257 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1958).
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simply by stepping across a state line long enough to contract."''
Indeed, most courts which are still saddled with the medieval immunity rule of the common law, will be quite willing to commit this
"extravagance." They will be more concerned with the unjustifiable
hardship that, in this commercial and mobile age, would otherwise
be imposed on those dealing abroad with women with hidden contractual incapacities.' 6 Mr. Justice Holmes conceded in the Grosman case that the forum has "no duty to protect under its own
law women who would not have been protected under their domiciliary law.'7 By the same token the state of the woman's domicile
should not extend its protection to foreign transactions at the expense of unwary citizens of other states.'
In contrast to the theory underlying the Grosman case, American courts have, therefore, in the vast majority of decided cases,
in effect upheld the contracts of married women, without regard
to invalidating laws of the forum, 19 of the place of contracting,20
or of the domicile. They have done so by resort either to their
own law,21 to the law of the situs, 22 the law of the domicile, 23 or
the law of the contract.24
15. 245 U.S. at 416.
16. See Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Kellogg, 183 N.Y. 92, 75 N.E. 1103 (1905)
(since defendant's endorsement gave no notice which would put a purchaser on
guard, defendant was estopped from claiming that her endorsement was a New
Jersey contract and therefore void). See generally EmiEuzwEIc, CONFuCT OF LAWS

20 (1959).
17. 245 U.S. at 417.
18. See 15 FLA. L.J. 268, 269 (1941), pleading against the right of "a married
woman to avoid payment of a debt which was valid and enforceable when made
merely by becoming domiciled in Florida." See also note 30 infra.
19. See note 26 infra.
20. But see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 333 (1934). For criticism see
COOK, THE LOGCAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 433, 440-41 (1942).
21. Connor v. Elliott, 79 Fla. 513, 85 So. 164 (1920) (also situs); Thomson
v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897) (same); Peretzman v. Borochoff, 58 Ca.
App. 838, 200 S.E. 331 (1938); Halley v. Ball, 66 Ill. 250 (1872); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Gober, 192 Miss. 729, 6 So. 2d 919 (1942); Johnston v. Gawtry, 83
Mo. 339 (1884); Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Kellogg, 183 N.Y. 92, 75 N.E. 1103
(1905); Voigt v. Brown, 42 Hun. 394 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1886); Poole v. Perkins, 126
Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919). See generally Currie, Married Women's Contracts:
A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958); Heilman,
Treatment of Capacity To Contract in Conflict of Laws Cases, 32 W. Va. L.Q.
102 (1926); Comment, 27 YALE L.J. 816 (1918).
22. See, e.g., Post v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 Ill.
559, 28 N.E. 978 (1891).
23. Freret v. Taylor, 119 La. 307, 44 So. 26 (1907). "[I]t is not the duty of the
states in which .. . parties may chance to temporarily sojourn to safeguard their
rights . . . in a manner . . . different from what is provided for in the state of

their domicile." Id. at 314, 44 So. at 27. See also Baer v. Terry, 108 La. 597, 32
So. 353 (1902).
24. Coxe v. Coxe, 21 Del. Ch. 30, 180 At. 612 (Ch. 1935); Meier & Frank Co.
v. Bruce, 30 Idaho 732, 168 Pac, 5 (1917); Robison v. Pease, 28 Ind. A pp. 610,
63 N.E. 479 (1902); Moody v. Barker, 188 Ky. 401, 222 S.W. 89 (1920); R. S.
Barbee & Co. v. Bevins, Hopkins & Co., 176 Ky. 113, 195 S.W. 154 (1917); Char-
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The few isolated cases which have invalidated contracts of married women which could have been upheld under either forum or
foreign law, can usually be explained on special grounds. Most of
these cases are an expression of a vanishing land taboo,25 and even
as to forum land some courts have found it possible to uphold contracts valid under a foreign law notwithstanding a forum law to
the contrary. 2 The peculiar use of renvoi in University of Chicago
v. Dater,7 which applied an invalidating forum law even as against
a validating law of the situs, is probably no longer authority. The
remaining cases which insist on invalidation under a law allegedly
applicable proprio vi/gore are either nearly or more than half a
century old,29 or limited to a few jurisdictions which apparently
continue to maintain the inequality of sexes.30 But in all other
ney v. Charney, 316 Mass. 580, 55 N.E.2d 917 (1944); Poison v. Stewart, 167 Mass.
211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); House v.
Lefebvre, 303 Mich. 207, 6 N.W.2d 487 (1942); Ohio ex rel. Fulton v. Purse, 273
Mich. 502, 263 N.W. 872 (1935); Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 52 Mo.
App. 357 (1893); Farmers State Bank v. Butler, 101 Neb. 635, 164 N.W. 562
(1917); Proctor v. Frost, 89 N.H. 304, 197 AtL 813 (1938); Hill v. Pine River
Bank, 45 N.H. 300 (1864); Mayer v. Roche, 77 N.J.L. 681, 75 Atl. 235 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1909); Law v. Smith, 68 N.J. Eq. 81, 59 At. 327 (Ch. 1904); National
Exch. Bank v. Rook Granite Co., 155 N.C. 43, 70 S.E. 1002 (1911); Federal
Corp. v. Dettelbach, 125 Pa. Super. 437, 189 AtL 492 (1937); Robinson v. Queen,
87 Tenn. 445, 11 S.W. 38 (1889); International Harvester Co. of America v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910). See also Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed.
742 (C.C.D. Ind. 1897); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Westervelt, 52 Coan.
586 (1879); Freret v. Taylor, 119 La. 307, 44 So. 26 (1907); Marks v. Germania
Say. Bank, 110 La. 659, 34 So. 725 (1903); Bank of Louisiana v. Williams, 46
Miss. 618, 629 (1872); Wright v. Remington, 41 N.J.L. 48 (Super. CL 1879).
25. EmmqzwmeG, Co ,Fnxr OF LAws 45, 59, 190, 206-09, 270 (1959). See,
e.g., Swank v. Hufaagle, 111 Ind. 453, 13 N.E. 105 (1887) (forum land); Smith
v. Ingram, 130 N.C. 100, 40 S.E. 984 (1902); Evans v. Beaver, 50 Ohio St. 190,
33 N.E. 643 (1893) (foreign mortgage); Taylor v. Leonard, 275 S.W. 134 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925) (forum land). See also Myers v. Steenberg, 206 Ala. 457, 90 So.
302 (1921); Hayden v. Stone, 13 ILL 106 (1880), distinguished as involving the
"remedy" in Brown v. Browning, 15 RL 422 (1886).
26. Proctor v. Frost, 89 N.H. 304, 197 At. 813 (1938). See also Poison v.
Stewart, 167 Mass. 211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897); Merrielles v. State Bank, 5 Tex.
Civ. App. 483, 24 S.W. 564 (1893).
27. 227 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
28. See House v. Lefebvre, 303 Mich. 207, 6 N.W.2d 487 (1942). On renvoi
see generally Ehrenzweig, Book Review, 8 A. J. Comp. L. - (1959).
29. Freeman's Appeal, 68 Conn., 533, 37 At. 420 (1897); Burr v. Beckler,
264 Ill. 230, 106 N.E. 206 (1914); Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall, 108 Iowa
518, 79 N.W. 282 (1899); Union Trust Co. v. Knabe, 122 Md. 584, 89 At. 1106
(1914); Union Natl Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902) (dissent properly pointing out that "the law presumes a lawful, and not an unlawful,
intent [and] . . . that she intended the note should be used in a state where she
could become ... a surety," id. at 547, 62 N.E. at 674); Armstrong, Cator & Co.
v. Best, 112 N.C. 59, 17 S.E. 14 (1893).
30. See, e.g., Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton, 145 Fla. 68, 199 So. 50
(1940) (but see note 18 .supra); Ulman, Magill & Jordan Woolen Co. v. Magill,
155 Ga. 555, 117 S.E. 657 (1923) (would even apply the lex fori as such); Sally
v. Bank of Union, 150 Ga. 281, 103 S.E. 460 (1920); Griswold v. Golding, 8 Ky.
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jurisdictions, in this field, too, the Basic Rule of Validation is entitled to express recognition.
Infants

"At common law a male infant attains his majority when he
becomes 21 years of age and all unexecuted contracts made by him
before that date, except for necessaries, while not absolutely void
are voidable at his election.""' Where statutes either change the
period of infancy or its legal consequences, conflicts of laws may
arise which, in the field of contracts, may require a choice between
the Rule of Validation and a state's interest in protecting its infants
against the consequences of their acts.
To Story the only issue was between the interest and law of the
infant's domicile of origin and those of his domicile at the time
of the transaction-" Giving preference to the former, he seems to
approve of the "faintly comic doctrine"3 " that "each state is presumed to be the best capable of judging, from the physical circumstances of climate and otherwise, when the faculties of its citizens
are morally or civilly perfect for the purposes of society."3 4 But
what we are concerned with today is only whether we should give
greater protection to persons who, having acted under one law as
if they had reached majority, conveniently claim an incapacity
under another law, or to those dealing with them in reliance on
the law of the transaction. The answer to this question can hardly
be doubtful under present economic conditions. Either the forum
law of the transaction 3" or the foreign law of domicile or contract or
forum law as such 6 will be applied in order to validate a contract of
a person claiming infancy under another law, unless the forum prefers
its own invalidating law to protect its own citizens against any transactions entered into under a validating law. 8 Whether or not a court
L. Rep. 777, 3 S.W. 535 (Ct. App. 1887) (but see note 24 supra); Marks v. Loowenberg, 143 La. 196, 78 So. 444 (1918) (but decided in a civil law jurisdiction);
Greenlee v. Hardin, 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777 (1930); Bramwell v. Conquest,
2 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
31. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N.Y. 188, 194, 99 N.E. 722,
725 (1912).
32. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws 50 passim (1834).
33. Smith, supra note 12, at 453.

34.

STORY,

CONFLICT OF LAWS

70 (183-4).

35. Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 255
U.S. 569 (1921) (forum contract upheld against foreign minor claiming invalidity
under forum law, with reference to unclean hands).
36. Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. R. 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Jamaica law
of the contract held not proved).
37. But see as to noncitizens Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., supra note 35.
38. International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N.Y. 188, 99 N.E. 722 (1912);
Marx v. Hefner, 46 Okla. 453, 149 Pac. 207 (1915) (possibly invalidating laws of
contract and domicile not pleaded). This policy may even apply as against foreign
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is to follow the latter practice should be determined by a conscious
choice between the demands of its own interest in protecting its
citizens and the demands of the Rule of Validation, rather than by

an alleged adherence to so-called rules of conflict of laws based
on irrelevant contacts of the contract.
emancipations under a peculiar exemption of such decrees from full faith and credit
otherwise due to sister state judgments. Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 851, 119 S.W.
75 (1909); Deason v. Jones, 7 Cal. App. 2d 482, 45 P.2d 1025 (Dist. Ct. App.
1935). See generally EmumqzwEic, CoNrcr OF LAwS 185-88 (1959).

